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Did the district court judge err in denying Mr. Dorton's 
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IV 
TEXT OP STATUTE 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single 
criminal episode—Included offenses.—(1) A defendant may be 
prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish 
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any 
such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than 
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy 
or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense 
otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a 
lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury 
with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall 
determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or 
reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought 
by the defendant. 
v 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
HARVEY DORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890273-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 19, 1982, a jury convicted 
Defendant/Appellant, Harvey Dorton, of Aggravated Kidnapping, 
Aggravated Robbery, and Aggravated Burglary. On July 14, 1982, the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered judgment and conviction 
(R. 285-6). Defendant/Appellant Dorton timely appealed his 
convictions to the Utah Supreme Court; on October 3, 1983, the 
Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Dorton's convictions (R. 660). The Court 
remitted the case to the Third Judicial District Court on 
December 9, 1983 (R. 659). 
On July 11, 1988, Defendant/Appellant filed pro se the 
"Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgement (sic) and Commitment" at 
issue in the instant appeal (R. 674) (see Addendum A). On 
August 24, 1988, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, reappointed trial 
counsel to represent Mr. Dorton at the hearing on the motion 
(R. 690). The State submitted a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant's motion (R. 691), and the trial court held a hearing on 
the motion on September 26, 1988 (R. 714). The trial court entered 
its written order denying the motion on October 3, 1988 (R. 719). 
This appeal arises out of the denial of Defendant/Appellant's Motion 
to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Commitment (R. 719). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 23, 1980, at approximately 7:00 p.m., two 
armed men wearing ski masks appeared in the kitchen of a house in 
Murray, Utah, where Betty and John Thomas were living (R. 441, 443, 
444, 464). .Garn Edwards was in the house babysitting his grandsons, 
Chance Pellum and Johnny Thomas (R. 442-3). The men indicated that 
they wanted to find John Thomas (R. 444, 464, 486). The larger man 
hit Mr. Edwards in the head with a revolver and fired a shot. Then, 
Mr. Edwards and the larger man went upstairs to find Betty Thomas1 
jewelry (R. 446). 
The larger man did not take any jewelry. He requested 
that Mr. Edwards give him the money in his wallet and any other 
valuables he had (R. 447). The pair then returned downstairs and 
Mr. Edwards sat with his grandsons (R. 447, 448). 
Later in the evening, at anywhere from 9:00 p.m. to 
10:30 p.m., Betty Thomas returned home (R. 450, 490). One of the 
men asked Betty to remove her jewelry and give it to him, which she 
did (R. 451). Betty gave her son Johnny some medicine, then went 
upstairs with the smaller man to prepare a bed for Johnny (R. 492, 
495, 452, 455). The smaller man performed sexual intercourse and 
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sodomy with Betty while the two were outside the presence of the 
larger man and the three remaining persons. 
Chance's mother, Barbara, arrived at about 11:00 p.m. and 
was greeted at the door by both men (R. 496). Barbara and the 
larger man then walked out to her car to get some cigarettes 
(R. 454). Several people were waiting for Barbara in the car. A 
few minutes after going outside, Barbara and the larger man returned 
to the house, and the larger man told his companion that there were 
people waiting in the car (R. 455, 457). The larger man then went 
back outside and returned with Grant Davis and Kevin Taylor 
(R. 457). Another person, Kimberley Pellum, had left (R. 458). 
The men asked Grant Davis for his money, which he gave to 
them (R. 458). The pair told all five people to lie on the floor, 
then, at about 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 midnight, they left (R. 459). 
The pair kept the ski masks on throughout the incident, 
but the larger man raised his up to his nose to smoke a cigarette 
(R. 460, 469, 485). Mr. Edwards tried to avoid looking at the men 
and purposely did not want to get a good look at them out of fear 
for himself and his grandchildren (R. 467). Nevertheless, at trial, 
Mr. Edwards indicated that he nthought" Mr. Dorton might be the 
taller of the two men (R. 462). 
Mr. Dorton presented an alibi defense. David Patch 
testified that he saw Mr. Dorton in Wendover on the night of the 
incident at about 12:00 midnight and had drinks with him (R. 342). 
Dean Buldock testified that he saw Mr. Dorton in Wendover on the 
night of the incident at about 10:30 p.m. The State's rebuttal 
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witness, Carl Freeman, testified that he saw Harvey Dorton in 
Alpine, Utah at about 9:30 p.m. on the night of the incident 
(R. 373). 
The trial court granted Mr. Dorton's motion to dismiss 
the charge of Aggravated Sexual Assault (R. 340). The jury 
convicted Mr. Dorton of Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery, 
and Aggravated Burglary (R. 424). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Defendant/Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Conviction. Mr. Dorton 
was convicted of three charges arising out of a single act during a 
single criminal episode. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
(1953 as amended), a defendant cannot be convicted of separate 
offenses arising out of a single act nor can he be convicted of 
multiple offenses which are lesser included offenses of one another. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 
MR. DORTON TO MORE THAN ONE OF THE OFFENSES 
CHARGED. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1952 as amended) allows the 
State to prosecute a defendant only for separate offenses rising out 
of a single criminal episode. That statute provides in pertinent 
part: 
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of 
single criminal episode—Included offenses.—(1) 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and 
the included offense. An offense is so included 
when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there 
is insufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for the offense charged but that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an 
included offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment of 
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the relationship of lesser included 
offenses. The court pointed out that while a defendant can be 
convicted of an offense which is charged, he or she cannot also be 
convicted of a lesser included offense of that offense. Id. 
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In determining whether an offense is a lesser included of 
some other offense, both a principal and secondary test must be 
applied. Under the principal test, the statutory elements of both 
offenses are compared to see whether one of the offenses "is 
established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged . . . " 
Id. at 97. 
The secondary test is required due to the multiple 
variations inherent in some offenses. The secondary test involves a 
consideration by the court of the evidence "to determine whether the 
greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations 
of the crime actually proved at trial." ixL In Hill, the Court 
held that Theft was a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery 
and reversed the Theft conviction and vacated the sentence thereon. 
See also State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 456 (Utah 1987) (Court reversed 
Theft conviction where Theft was lesser included offense of 
Aggravated Robbery); State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 115-16 (Utah 
1986) (Theft is a lesser included offense of Burglary in this 
context); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1313-14 (Utah 1986) 
(Aggravated Robbery is lesser included offense of First Degree 
Murder under the circumstances). 
In the instant case, the trial court erred in allowing 
the conviction for more than one offense to stand. Aggravated 
Kidnapping is a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery since, 
in all robberies, a person must be detained or restrained. 
Aggravated Robbery under the circumstances of this case is a lesser 
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included offense of Aggravated Burglary, which was charged as an 
entry into a dwelling "with the intent to commit a theft, assault or 
felony" (R. 18). Here, where the facts establish that the entry was 
done with intent to commit a felony, the separate felony cannot also 
sustain a conviction. See Pitts, 728 P.2d at 115-6. 
In the instant case, Defendant/Appellant was convicted of 
committing one continuous act. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1953 as 
amended) prohibits punishment for separate crimes based on a single 
act. Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Dorton should have 
been sentenced on only one of the first degree felonies arising out 
of this single criminal episode. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Dorton respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his Motion to 
Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Conviction and remand the case with 
an order that the sentence on two of the charges be vacated and that 
judgment and conviction on only a single charge arising out of this 
criminal episode be entered. 
Respectfully submitted this (^ day of June, 1989. 
1#NN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Harvey Dorton 
Attorney Pro Se 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
.<& 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE SENTENCE/ 
JUDGEMENT AND COMMITMENT 
Criminal Case No. CR-81-310 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
HARVEY DORTON, 
Defendant . 
000O000 
Comes now the Defendant, Harvey Dorton, by and 
through himself, attorney pro se, and hereby requests this 
Honorable Court to grant Defendant's motion to set aside 
his prior sentence, judgement and commitment as prayed for, 
and for the reasons as hereinafter submitted to this Court 
for its consideration. 
1. That on the 14th day of July, 1982, before the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, appeared James S. Housley, the 
attorney for the State of Utah, and the Defendant appeared 
in person and by counsel, Lynn R. Brown. 
2. That on the 14th day of July, 1982, the Court 
held that the Defendant was found guilty by a jury in abstentia 
of the offenses of aggravated burglary, a felony of the first 
degree; aggravated kidnapping, a felony of the first degree; 
and aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree. 
1 3. That the mandate of the Utah Code of Criminal 
2 Procedures, 1987-1988, with respect to Section 76-1-402, 
3 only allows for separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
4 episode-included offenses as follows: 
5 (1) A defendant may be prosecuted 
in a single criminal action for all separate 
6 offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of 
7 a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
8 punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall 
9 b£ punishable under only one provision; 
an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
10 under any such provision bars a prosecution 
under any other such provison. 
11 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
12 separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders 
13 to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for 
14 multiple offenses when: 
15 [A] The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court, and 
16 
[B] The offenses are known to the 
17 prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information 
18 or indictment. 
19 (3) A defendant may be convicted 
of an offense included in the offense 
20 charged but may not be convicted of both 
the offense charged and the included 
21 offense. An offense is so included when: 
22 [A] It is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts required 
23 to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
24 
[B] It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
25 conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense 
26 otherwise included therein; or 
27 [C] It is specifically designated 
by a statute as a lessor included offense. 
28 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquiting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after 
verdict of judgement/ or an appellate 
court on 'appealor certiorari1/ shall 
determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is 
evidence to support a conviction for 
an included offense/ and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required 
for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgement of conviction 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgement 
of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of new trial/ 
if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
4. The Defendant submits the following criminal 
ngs are in reference to the instant case present 
is court for review: 
(A) Wash. App. 1977. In ascertaining 
existence of lessor included offense, 
court must look for identity of elements 
between two crimes/ as established mainly 
by definitions of crimes in criminal 
codes/ and often with reference to particular 
evidentiary facts; to show that there 
exists lessor included offense/ more 
is usually required than showing that 
two crimes are similar or that in proving 
offense charged state inevitably proved 
lessor offense. State v. Dennis/ 561 
P. 2d 219/ 16 Wash. App. 939. 
(B) Ariz. 1978. If a jury finds defendant 
guilty of two charges arising from same 
transaction and there are not sufficient 
independant facts to support the elements 
of both crimes/ trial judge should then 
set aside the lessor conviction. A.R.S. 
13-1641, in State v. Bowie/ 580 P. 2d 
1282, 1190, 119 Ariz. 336. 
(C) Ariz. 1977. Where separate acts 
give rise to separate crimes, defendant 
1|| can be convicted of both crimes consistent 
2 
11 
with statute prohibiting double punishment, 
A.R.S. 13-1641 in State v. Arnold, 565 
P. 2d 1282, 115 Ariz. 421 
(D) Okl. Cr. 1970. A series of criminal 
charges cannot be based on the same criminal 
act or transaction; a single criminal 
act cannot be split up or subdivided 
into two or more distinct offenses and 
6|| prosecuted as such. 63 O.S. 1961, 451, 
in Heldenbrand v. Mills, 476 P. 2d 375. 
7,, 
(E) Utah 1978. Though crimes of robbery 
8|| and kidnapping arose out of same criminal 
episode, conviction of defendant for 
9|| both offenses was prohibited by statute. 
U.C.A. 1953, 76-1-401, 76-1-402, 76-1-402(1) 
10 in State v. Eichler, 584 P. 2d 861. 
5« That the Utah Supreme Court held the following 
12 in State v. Hill, case number 18180, on November 1, 1983: 
13|| STATE of Utah/ Plaintiff and 
Respondent/ 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Wendell Irving HILL/ Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18180 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Nov. 1, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine 
M. Durham, J., of theft and aggravated 
robbery, and defendant appealed, challenging 
conviction and sentence for theft. The 
Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that under 
circumstances of case, crime of theft 
was lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery. 
Conviction of theft reversed, and 
sentence thereon vacated; and all other 
respects, affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law - 29 
Conviction of lesser included offense 
is permitted as alternative to charged 
offense, but is not permitted as addition 
to it. 
2. Criminal Law - 29/ 984(2) 
Where two crimes are such that greater 
could not be committed without necessarily 
having committed lesser, then as a matter 
of law they stand in relationship of 
greater and lesser offenses, and defendant 
cannot be convicted or punished for both. 
3. Criminal Law - 29, 984(2) 
In order to determine if defendnt 
can be convicted and punished for two 
different crimes committed in connection 
with single criminal episode, court must 
consider evidence to determine whether 
greater-leser relationship exists between 
specific variations of crimes actually 
proved at trial. 
4. Indictment and Information - 191(9) 
Where only evidence before jury 
showed compelted robbery, with property 
taken from person of manager by use of 
firearm, and crime of theft as part of 
that same criminal episode, crime of 
theft was lesser included offense of 
aggravated robbery. 
5. Criminal Law - 886 
When defendant has been improperly 
convicted of both greater and lesser 
offense, it is appropriate to regard 
conviction on leser offense as mere sur-
plusage, which does not invalidate convic-
tion and sentence on greater offense. 
Brooke C. Wells of Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., 
Robert N. Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This case turns on whether theft 
is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery on the facts of this case. 
[1] The relationship of leser included 
offenses is significant for two purposes. 
"A defendant [1] may be convicted of 
an offense charged [2] but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged 
and the included offense." U.C.A., 1953, 
76-1-402(3). In other words, conviction 
of a lesser included offense (1) is permitted 
as an alternate to the charged offense, 
but (2) is not permitted as an addition 
to it. This case involves the second 
issue—conviction and sentence for theft 
in addition to aggravated robbery. 
The prosecution's evidence showed 
that defendant and a companion forced 
their way into the manager's apartment 
at the Stratford Hotel in downtown Salt 
Lake City. Defendant held a pistol. 
After threatening to kill the manager 
and a guest, the intruders bound and 
gagged the two occupants. They took 
a tape recorder, a TV, several items 
of radio equipment, and about $70 in 
cash from a desk. A few minutes later, 
defendant and his companion were arrested 
several blocks away in an automobile 
containing some currency, all the items 
taken from the apartment, and the pistol 
used in the crime. As a result of this 
episode, defendant was charged with and 
convicted of four crimes, including aggravated 
robbery of the manager and theft from 
the manager. The court sentenced defendant 
to 5 years to life on aggravated robbery 
and to a concurrent lesser sentence on 
theft. On appeal, defendant challenges 
Only the conviction and sentence for 
theft, contending that it is improper 
in addition to the conviction for aggravated 
robbery because theft is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated robbery. 
We conclude that for purposes of 
the prohibition against conviction "of 
both the offense charged and the included 
offense," 76-1-402(3), the greater-lesser 
reslationship must be determined by comparing 
the statutory elements of the two crimes 
as a theoretical matter and, where necessary, 
by reference to the facts proved at trial. 
[2] The principal test involves 
a comparison of the statutory elements 
of each crim. Subsection 76-1-402(3)(a) 
provides the definition of leser included 
offenses that is applied for this purpose: 
an offense is lesser included when fl[i]t 
is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged . . ." 
Thus, where the two crimes are "such 
that the greater cannot be committed 
without necessarily having committed 
the lesser," State v. Baker, Utah, 671 
P. 2d 152, 156 (1983), then as a matter 
of law they stand in the relationship 
of greater and lesser offenses, and the 
defendant cannot be convicted or punished 
for both. So it is with robbery and 
theft, which are generally acknowledged 
to occupy the greater-lesser relationship. 
State v. Elliott, Utah, 641 P. 2d 122, 
123 (1982); People v. Cole, 31 Cal. 3d 
568, 582, 645 P. 2d 1182, 1191, 183 Cal. 
Rptr. 350, 359 (1982). 
[3] The secondary test is required 
by the circumstance that some crimes 
have multiple variations, so that a greater-
lesser relationship exists between some 
variations of these crimes, but not between 
others. E.g., State in Interest of L.G.W., 
Utah, 641 P. 2d 127, 130-31 (1982) (forcible 
sexual abuse and lewdness). A theoretical 
comparison of the statutory elements 
of two crimes having multiple variations 
will be insufficient. In order to determine 
whether a defendant can be convicted 
and punished for two different crimes 
committed in connection with a single 
criminal episode, the court must consider 
the evidence to determine whether the 
greater-lesser relationship exists between 
the specific variations of the crimes 
actually proved at trial. The multiple 
variations of the crime of aggravated 
robbery involved in this case show why 
this is necessary. 
Aggravated robbery is committed 
by using a firearm in one of three circum-
stances: "[1] in an attempt to commit, 
[2] during the commission of, or [3] in 
the immediate fight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery." 76-6-302(1) 
and (3). As the district court concluded, 
according to a theoretical comparison 
of the statutory elements of each crime/ 
theft is not a lesser included offense 
of aggravated robbery because theft is 
not "established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of [one variation 
of] the offense charged." 76-1-402(3)(a). 
This is because the obtaining or exercising 
of unauthorized control over the property 
of another (an element of theft) is not 
an element of the first variation of 
aggravated robbery (use of a gun in an 
attempt to commit a robbery). In contrast/ 
the greater-lesser relationship does 
exist between theft and the second variation 
o£ aggravated robbery (use of a gun during 
the commission of a robbery). 
[4] In this case, the only evidence 
before the jury showed a completed robbery, 
with property taken from the person of 
the manager by use of a firearm, and 
the crime of theft as part of that same 
criminal episode. As to this variation 
of aggravated robbery, the crime of theft 
is a lesser included offense. Consequently/ 
on the facts of this case, 76-1-402(3) 
clearly bars,this defendant's being convicted 
and punished for theft in addition to 
aggravated robbery. 
[5] When a defendant has been improperly 
convicted of both a greater and a lesser 
offense, it is appropriate to regard 
the conviction on the leser offense as 
mere surplusage, which does not invalidate 
the conviction and sentence on the greater 
offense. United States v. Howard, 507 
F. 2d 559 (8th Cir. 1974). 
The conviction for theft is reversed, 
and the sentence thereon is vacated. 
In all other respects, the judgements 
of conviction and the related sentences 
are affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART AND HOWE, JJ., 
and ERNEST F. BALDWIN, Jr., District 
Judge, concur. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified 
a r*iy 
herself/ does not participate herein; 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN/ Jr., District Judge, 
sat. 
6. The Defendant submits that other state courts 
in favor of defendants when charged with multiple 
ising out of the same criminal episode: 
(A) Alaska 1985. Four factors to consider 
in deciding whether statute describes 
single offense or multiple offenses are: 
Language of statute itself, 
Legislative history, 
Nature of proscribed conduct/ 
And appropriateness of multiple 
punishment for conduct charged in indictment. 
SEE: State v. James, 698 P. 2d 1161. 
(B) Utah 1986. Theft was lesser included 
offense of aggravated robbery/ and therefore, 
conviction and sentence for theft, after 
defendant was convicted of aggravated 
robbery, were improper. U.C.A. 1953, 
76-1-402(3), in State v. Shaffer, 725 
P. 2d 1301. 
(C) Utah 1983. Conviction of lesser 
included offense is permitted as alternative 
to charged offense, but is not permitted 
in addition to it. SEE: State v. Hill, 
674 P. 2d 96. 
(D) Utah 1980. The general test as to 
whether there are separate offenses or 
one offense is whether the evidence discloses 
one general intent or discloses separate 
and distinct intents; the particular 
facts and circumstances determine this 
question. 
If there is but one intention, 
One general impulse, and 
One general plan, 
Even though there is a series of transactions 
there is but one offense. SEE: State 
v. Kimbel, 620 P. 2d 515. ^ <~r 
r* A: ifcc 
1 CONCLUSION 
2 THEREFORE, in conclusion of the facts as set forth 
3 above, the Defendant prays that this Honorable Court will 
4 grant said motion filed herein, and to furthermore set aside 
5 all previously entered orders of judgement, sentence and 
6]| commitment of the Defendant. And finally, to resentence 
the Defendant to only one of the offenses of either aggravated 
8 robbery, a felony of the first degree, or aggravated burglary, 
9 a felony of the first degree, or aggravated kidnapping, a 
ony of the first degree, as prescribed by law and set 
11 I forth in the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1988. 
12|. 
13 DATED on this day of July, 1988. 
14 I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
15 
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281 
"flARVEY^CORTON/Defendant 
Attorney Pro Se 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
1 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2 1/ Harvey Dorton, Defendant above named, hereby 
3 certify that I have mailed a true and correct photocopy of 
4II the foregoing MOTION TO SET ASIDE SENTENCE, JUDGEMENT AND 
5ll COMMITMENT, postage prepaid, to the following on this 
6| day of July, 1988 
7 
8| | (1) DAVID YOOKUM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
9|| Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
431 South 300 East 
10|| Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
llll (2) LYNN BROWN 
Attorney at Law 
12|| c/o Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
333 South 200 East 
13|| Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MARVEY/DORTONTDefendant 
17|| Attorney Pro Se 
Post Office Box 250 
18|| Draper, Utah 84020 
19 
20 
21J 
221 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
281 
11 
1 
21 
31 41 
51 
61 
7 
81 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
141 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
241 
25 
26 
27 
28 
A D D E N D U M S 
!•> 
TED. CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: ROGER S. BLAYLOCK 
Deputy County Attorney 
431 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff ) 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
vs ) 
) 
4ARVEY DORTON 
) Case No. CR-81-310 
Defendant ) 
On the 14th day of July, 1982, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
ippeared James S. Housley, the attorney for the State of Utah, and the 
lefendant appeared in person and by counsel, Lynn R. Brown. 
The Court having asked if the defendant has anything to say why 
idgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary 
eing shown or appearing to the Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the offenses of 
.ggravated Burglary, a, first degree felony; Aggravated Kidnapping, a first 
egree felony; and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the 
tah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and 
hich may be for life, and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of 
ggravated Burglary; and that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the 
tah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and 
hich may be for life and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of 
jqravated Kidnapping; and that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at 
e Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and 
lich may be for life and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of 
jgravated Robbery. Said sentences shall run concurrently. Commitment 
ayed for 10 days. 
IT IS ORDERED that N. D. Hay ward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
of Utah, take the said defendant, Harvey Dorton, and deliver said 
iant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said 
iant shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in accordance with 
udgment and Commitment. 
DATED this %\> day of July, 1982. 
BY THE COURT 
ft 
Bryant H./Croft, Judge f -AA 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-18-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended 1980, and in accordance with the guidelines developed 
intly between the Courts and the Board of Pardons, I recommend that the 
idant serve $ffi* lo 0 months prior to release or parole. 
Imprisonment is ordered in deviation from the guidelines because: 
Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 
^O^ut t^iA/jr^/vY^ 3 -tAj^r ckjjfrj&L fU^r^y CJL-*-£<? L^- ^h-cH^. 
BY THE COURT 
Tgdff^t/i. Crott, Judge AT __ 
W. STERLING EVAN; 
rtERK' 
W "^ 
-BY 
